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we obtained the purchasing power parity (ppp) conversion factor for each country from the international monetary fund, and converted all prices to us dollars. all data from gtis were converted to us dollars using the same conversion rate. to investigate the effect of trophy hunting on national economies, we used the economic growth rates and gdp of each country for the same time period. the gdp data were extracted from the world bank data explorer (), which provides a database of country data extracted from the world development indicators (wdi) database, and the country-specific gdp data was provided by the world bank for each country.
in addition to the data from gtis and tawiri, we acquired data from local and international governmental organisations and ngos to help us understand the political dynamics of hunting in tanzania. we used data from the tanzanian ministry of natural resources and tourism, and from the tanzania forest conservation and development project (tfcdp), a project of the united states agency for international development, to understand the political role of trophy hunting.
the sgr lion trophy hunting system was different to most in africa as it was based on competitive allocation of blocks rather than on individual quotas. this is important for tourism, because large numbers of tourists are willing to pay a premium to hunt lions [ 65, 66 ] and so the system should encourage the use of blocks by individuals rather than the government. these blocks were managed using various forms of tenure, but for those with the highest trophy hunting offtake the tenure was often very short. such short-term tenures tended to encourage the use of more trophy hunting days by individual hunters, but tended to result in a decline in trophy offtake over time, as individuals hunt their block over fewer days.
many reports (e.g. [ 42 ]), and anecdotal evidence (e. [ 43 ]), have noted that trophy hunters frequently violate tanzanian laws prohibiting the hunting of lions in protected areas. however, the extent to which this has actually occurred is unknown, and there is little systematic evidence on what happens to lions killed by hunters when they return to a national park and try to enter or re-enter the park. we found three main patterns of action by the tanzanian government in response to trophy hunters hunting in national parks. first, the government generally ignores the illegal hunting activity and there are no penalties or sanctions for it, provided that the hunting company is able to produce a valid hunting license and paid the appropriate fees and taxes. second, the government sanctions hunting companies or individuals who violate the law and prohibit them from re-entering the park. third, if a lion killed by a trophy hunter is found in a national park, the government will order that the lion be killed. in the past five years, the tanzanian government has established strict penalties for trophy hunters who hunt in national parks and have been ordered by the government to pay compensation to a conservancy (where the lion was killed) or to the ministry of natural resources and tourism, for the cost of the lion’s capture, tax, and transport from the national park to a conservancy where the lion was killed.
in the tanzanian case, while the 1995 policy and management plan [ 60 ] aims to formalise competitive, non-competitive and concessionary hunting approaches, it leaves the details of the concessionary system up to the discretion of the directorate of wildlife and national parks. the 2005 management and research handbook for tanzania’s national parks, game management areas and wildlife management areas [ 61 ] provides a more complete framework for trophy hunting, but again leaves most of the details up to local authorities. in this case, the lack of provisions for long-term, market-based lease of blocks, along with the increasing number of long-term blocks, are causes for concern. it is clear that the current system also does not provide the incentives for sustainable hunting, and so better management practices are required. one of the key recommendations in the tanzania management and research handbook is the need to increase block tenure, and make the allocation of blocks more transparent and fair.